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Over the past 40 years we have witnessed a major shift in our concerns for the use of rural land.  The 
postwar priority for domestic food production has been replaced by a new perspective that 
recognises a wider range of values, particularly for landscapes, biodiversity, water and climate.  The 
multifunctionality model sets agricultural commodity production alongside non-commodity public 
goods (OECD, 2001).  This views agriculture as the provider of environmental benefits in joint 
production with agricultural products.  But it sits uncomfortably alongside the mounting evidence of 
the environmental damage caused by agricultural activities, some of which undermines the 
productive capacity of the farming industry itself. The recent assessment by the Intergovernmental 
Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) confirms that current 
agricultural practices, encouraged by agricultural policies, are not sustainable.  We are experiencing 
land degradation, loss of biodiversity and ecosystem functions and loss of local plant varieties and 
breeds of livestock (IPBES, 2019). 
 
Government has at least partially recognised the problems.  Policies have been reformed to restrain 
the most perverse incentives, particularly through decoupling.  But many of the policy approaches 
that give priority to agriculture remain in place.  Under the CAP the overwhelming majority of 
funding directed to influence rural land uses and practices goes to ‘active’ farmers. However, it is 
hard to identify any rationale that justifies the direct payments made to landholders.  The European 
Commission (2017 p.3) argues that payments have ‘helped European farmers focus more effectively 
on the demands of the market and strengthened their long term viability’.  But it is not clear why 
payments unrelated to production activity should help a focus on the market, rather the contrary 
might be expected.  And it may be questioned as to why all farms in all circumstances need to have 
their long term viability strengthened through a fixed rate payment.  The payments make ‘a very 
important contribution to overall farm income’ but the equal payment across all land areas provide 
large payments to large businesses and are not targeted on households with low incomes. Further 
the Commission argues that payments enhance farmers’ role in protecting the environment and in 
the developing the rural economy.  In fact as already noted, agricultural production is widely seen as 
a major cause of environmental harm and the general trend in environmental indicators has been 
one of decline (RSPB, 2016), most recently highlighted by the evidence of significant decline in insect 
populations (Powney, et al., 2019).  Even the cross-compliance and greening that are directed at the 
environment are standard requirements applied largely indiscriminately across farmed areas with 
little positive impact (Pe’er et a., 2014) and no attempt to target effort on the areas or actions that 
could generate the highest marginal environmental benefits.  Policies have been introduced, 
particularly for biodiversity.  Conservation measures aim to offer protection for habitats and species 
that have come under greatest pressure.  Agri-environment programmes have been adopted across 
the European Union and elsewhere with some success, but, the impacts are mixed (Batáry, et al., 
2015).  In this context, it has been stressed that biodiversity conservation efforts need to be ‘more, 




But at the same time, other values deriving from rural land policy have gained greater prominence.  
Climate change in particular is a major driver of numerous challenges.  It exacerbates the present 
problems; biodiversity has to cope with forces that introduce alien species and change the context 
within which conservation takes place.  Agricultural systems need to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions and take account of the place of carbon in the landscape.  It is argued that agriculture 
needs to change from a net source to a net sink of greenhouse gases (Rockstrom, 2017).  Farming 
needs to adapt to mitigate flood risk and to even out water availability over time.  Water quality has 
not reached the standards required under the EU Water Framework Directive, substantially due to 
diffuse pollution from farming, and there are renewed concerns about the long term sustainability of 
soils. 
 
One consequence of Brexit is that the UK, with its devolved administrations in Belfast, Cardiff and 
Edinburgh, has the opportunity and freedom to develop new responses to the challenges; whilst 
recognising that these concerns have a wider resonance throughout Europe and elsewhere.  The UK 
Conservative Government aims to be the first to leave the environment in a better state than that in 
which it found it.  The Agriculture Bill paves the way for a simpler system of regulation and 
enforcement.  This prioritises spending on public goods and environmental outcomes (Curnow, 
2018).  The government’s 25 Year Environment Plan sets ambitious goals: clean and plentiful water, 
thriving plants and wildlife, using resources from nature more sustainably and efficiently, enhanced 
beauty, heritage and engagement with the natural environment (HM Government, 2018).  Clearly 
ambition is a necessary first step, but there is a gap in terms of the governance arrangements that 
can deliver the ambition in the ‘best’ way: Where are land uses to be changed? How are stakeholder 
values to be taken into account? How is the delivery of different ecosystem services to be integrated 
within local contexts?  How are natural capital generally and the environmental enhancements more 
particularly to be maintained over time?  How does the approach to policy respond to changing 
priorities, constraints and opportunities over time?  
 
We need to rethink the approach towards the governance of rural land (Hodge, 2016; Dwyer and 
Hodge, 2016; Martin, 2016; OECD, 2017), to establish institutions that can deliver outcomes after 
Brexit that meet the contemporary challenges for the maintenance of natural capital and the 
sustainability of ecosystem services.   
 
The elements of governance 
 
A first element in the development of any policy is the establishment of an objective.  The post war 
imperative for increased domestic food production stood at the core of agricultural policy but since 
the surpluses of the 1980s it has increasingly conflicted with other goals, compromising water 
quality, biodiversity and climate change.  We should set a new overarching objective.  This should be 
to maximise the long term social value of the ecosystem services that are derived from natural 
capital.  It will not be possible to quantify this goal, but it represents a clear objective.  
 
This requires further elements of governance.  It first demands a clear position with regard to the 
rights and duties for the ownership and management of land and environment.  This sets the 
reference level or baseline against which decisions can be taken.  Our social judgements about 
where this lies shift over time as scarcities, preferences and constraints alter the nature of the 
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domain within which natural resource management takes place.  Over time, for example, we have 
generally come to treat the leaching of nitrates in water from agricultural land as a form of pollution, 
regulated through nitrate vulnerable zones.  We may now question whether the emission of 
greenhouse gases should be treated similarly, or whether there should be a duty on landholders to 
maintain levels of carbon in soil.   
 
In a capitalist system most values are determined through the operation of markets as facilitated 
and constrained by the state.  But increasingly large and now, arguably, the predominant values 
arising from rural land have the characteristics of public goods (and bads).  Once provided, it is not 
possible to exclude people from the impacts, good or bad.  Experience of the impact by one person 
does not deplete the experience impacted on others.  Thus, for example, landscapes and biodiversity 
are generally available to all.  Flood protection benefits large numbers of residents and businesses 
downstream.  Carbon sequestration mitigates the impacts of climate change for the global 
population.  In this context we require governance structures for identifying the values on which 
collective actions can be based.   
 
Some values may be determined though the development of augmented markets or through new 
domains of exchange.  Product certification gives prospective consumers better information about a 
product and its production methods.  Consumers concerned about animal welfare can choose to buy 
products whose production has been certified to reach certain defined welfare standards.  We are 
beginning to explore the opportunities for the development of new markets for the delivery of 
ecosystem services (see e.g. Green Alliance, 2017), such as water companies paying land managers 
for changes in practices that enhance water quality.  But the public good nature of many of the 
ecosystem services places limits on the scope of such markets.  Individuals or companies may choose 
to offset their carbon emissions by paying for afforestation, but such payments are voluntary and, 
given the incentive to free-ride, the take-up is unlikely to be sufficient to achieve the socially desired 
level. 
 
Devolved decision-making and implementation 
 
In the absence of markets, values are formed collectively through various factors such as cultural 
norms or the operation of the state.  The principle of subsidiarity (Alm and Banzhaf, 2012) proposes 
that decisions should be devolved to the feasible level closest to those affected by the consequences 
of the decision.  In principle that might imply an infinite number of valuation contexts between 
decisions that affect only me and decisions that affect the whole world.  In practice valuation needs 
to be associated with opportunities to take action in relation to those valuations and here we simply 
suggest that values can be formed either nationally or locally.   
 
A range of ecosystem values are of evident national or international significance.  National 
governments enter into international commitments, such as the Aichi Targets under the Convention 
on Biological Diversity or Nationally Determined Contributions towards climate change mitigation.  
Similarly national governments identify nationally important assets, such as national parks or they 
set national targets, perhaps for afforestation.  Other values are of more local significance.  The 
interactions amongst those affected by water use and water quality will be strongest amongst those 
living and operating within a particular catchment.  The quality of a landscape, biodiversity and 
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public access in areas that are not major tourist destinations may be of most importance to those 
living within the local area.   
 
This logically leads to system of multilevel governance (Ostrom, 2010).  The transactions costs of 
organising structures that bring stakeholders together for the purpose of collective decision-making 
clearly need to be balanced against the increased validity that may be achieved by more locally 
based decision-making.  In the UK, agriculture is a devolved matter with responsibilities transferred 
to governments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.  This arrangement has applied to date 
under the CAP with the oversight of the EU and Brexit raises complex and controversial questions 
about the new arrangements to be implemented (House of Lords, 2017).  However, in this context, 
we propose a national (viz. UK and England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) and a local level 
of decision-making.  The argument here is that some element of decision making should be devolved 
to a sub-national level. 
 
National agencies would operate funds for the procurement of ecosystem services of national 
importance, such as for climate mitigation or biodiversity conservation.  The approaches taken 
would be different towards different ecosystem services.  A national target for reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions would seek to identify the most cost-effective measures, irrespective of 
location.  The national scale would then maximise the cost effectiveness of measures across the 
country as a whole.  The delivery of biodiversity targets in contrast would need to be spatially 
targeted to promote particular species and habitats where intervention contributes most to national 
objectives. 
 
In parallel with this, there would be a locally based system of Local Environmental Governance 
Organisations (LEGO).  A LEGO might be seen as the ultimate ‘owner’ of the local ecosystem, acting 
as a trustee on behalf of the local community and future generations.  Each LEGO would represent 
local stakeholder interests in identifying natural capital assets within its area and implementing 
procurement schemes in order to deliver the mix of services that best meets local priorities.  This 
could be based on a natural capital plan to identify a baseline and local priorities, implemented 
under a constraint to meet sustainability conditions. It might, for instance, adopt a ‘strong aggregate 
capital rule’ requiring that the aggregate level of renewable natural capital should be kept at least 
constant, and profit from the depletion of non-renewable natural capital should be invested in 
renewable natural capital (Helm, 2015).  This might ultimately be set out as a duty on LEGOs as an 
implementation of a public trust doctrine.  Effective decision-making and delivery depends on social 
and cultural as well as natural capital.  Social and cultural capital require investment in relationships 
and continuity in approach over periods of time rather than policies that change regularly every few 
years.  This should also be nurtured by LEGOs.  An outline of the approach is illustrated in Figure 1.   
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Public procurement of ecosystem services 
 
The prevalence of missing markets implies a continuing role for the state in the procurement of 
ecosystem services on behalf of the general public at multiple levels.  Experience with the 
implementation of agri-environment schemes has identified a variety of approaches that have the 
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potential to enhance the cost-effectiveness of procurement schemes (Cullen et al., 2018), such as 
targeting, competitive tendering and reverse auctions, payment by results or collective contracts.   
 
The procurement approach would seek to expand economic opportunities by creating incentives for 
delivery to exploit economies of scale and scope.  Considerable attention has been given in recent 
years to catchment planning and landscape scale biodiversity conservation.  In order to coordinate 
land management activities at a sufficient scale it will be necessary to promote cooperation amongst 
individual land managers.  This may be incentivised through paying a premium to land managers 
who participate in a larger scale plan for ecosystem delivery.  Kuhfuss et al., (2016) for instance 
found that pro-environmental behaviour could be encouraged through a bonus payment made 
when a pre-defined total area was enrolled.  Alternatively, ecosystem delivery could be 
implemented through farmer associations or cooperatives; the rapid growth of farmer clustersi 
suggests an enthusiasm for co-operative working.  More widely, schemes might be implemented 
through partnerships comprising collaborations of both land managers and other stakeholders 
contributing different resources and expertise. 
 
Integration across different ecosystem service delivery takes place at the local scale.  Land managers 
on the ground are best informed as to the opportunities and costs of implementing the delivery of 
multiple services within a single location.  While a national agency might have the capacity to 
identify the best locations for the delivery of a single service, such as habitat conservation, it cannot 
know the direct and opportunity costs faced by individual land managers, their expertise and 
aspirations, or the potential conflicts and synergies amongst different ecosystem services.  There are 
often complementary relationships in the delivery of a range of non-market ecosystem services at a 
particular location (Austin, et al., 2016).  Land management, such as re-wilding, can have the 
potential to deliver simultaneously biodiversity conservation, landscape enhancement, carbon 
storage, flood mitigation and public access through a single scheme.  The procurement approach 
should create incentives for land managers to seek out these potential economies of scope. 
 
This suggests that land managers might hold a portfolio with multiple contracts with different 
agencies for the delivery of different ecosystem services alongside their conventional market-
oriented agricultural production.  It is clearly important that in this context managers are not paid 
multiple times for the same work.  There are two possible approaches towards this.  One would be 
that effective competition drives bidders to seek only the marginal cost of the extra work required to 
deliver the extra service being delivered.  A second approach might be that larger scale local 
ecosystem service schemes are negotiated within areas between consortia of service demanders 
from both public and private sectors, and groups of land holders who can control an area of 
sufficient scale to be able to deliver multiple services cost-effectively.  Such negotiations would be 
complex and face a challenge of potential free-riding.  But they could have the potential to meet 
multiple demands and, on the basis that they would be expected to continue over relatively long 
periods of time, would not need to be renegotiated very often. 
 
The system faces considerable uncertainty and a changing environment.  The approaches adopted 
need to adapt as information improves over time.  In areas of greatest uncertainty, procurement 
contracts might be seen as experiments testing alternative approaches towards the desired 
objectives.  For instance, there are numerous ways in which changes in agricultural systems can 
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potentially reduce levels of greenhouse gas emissions, but little agreement as to which can be most 
cost-effective.  The accumulation of evidence from monitoring a range of contracts over time would 
support the development of better guidelines for agricultural practices and provide a clearer focus in 
conservation efforts. 
 
Securing investments in the longer term 
 
Relatively short term voluntary instruments, such as have been applied under agri-environment 
policies, cannot ensure the protection of the environmental gains that are generated in the longer 
term.  At the end of the contract, in the face of changing prices and priorities, either party can 
withdraw and the land may be returned to intensive and environmentally damaging agricultural 
uses.  Longer term arrangements, such as the transfer of ownership to conservation organisations, 
the establishment of land trusts or the use of conservation covenants can secure land use changes 
into the future.  Such a long term approach can be especially critical in securing effective ecological 
restoration or carbon sequestration.  This implies that procurement funds should have the flexibility 
to provide support through a variety of mechanisms, including changes of land ownership and 
conservation covenants, and not just through the allocation of short term environmental contracts. 
 
There is a tension too between the financial discipline of short term contracts with clear targets, 
milestones and regular review on the one hand and long term ecological restoration and investment 
in natural capital on the other.  Investments in natural capital may require long term commitment of 
funding and, especially ex ante, have uncertain outcomes.  This challenges the conventional 
approach to project allocation based on clearly defined outputs to be delivered over a predefined 
time period.  A resolution may be through the development of longer term programme funding 
where a closer relationship is built up between funder and fundee based on financial transparency 




Current approaches to agricultural policy are embedded and capitalised into rural systems so that 
change will not be easy.  But we argue that there are substantial potential gains to be had from a 
change of approach.  It is not sufficient simply to set out ambitious targets for long term change.  
The governance arrangements also need to be put in place in order to determine national and local 
priorities, to identify and secure the cost-effective land use interventions and to monitor and refine 
the approaches.  While these do not currently exist, there are a number of initiatives often in local 
areas and relating to individual ecosystem services from which we can learn.  At this stage we need 
better understanding in respect of a range of aspects, such as: 
• Mapping and co-ordinating networks of local groups across different ES 
• More research and development on governance approaches 
• Refining competitive funding mechanisms for procurement at lowest cost 
• Developing approaches to longer term programme funding and qualitative assessment 
• Understanding potential and limits of PES schemes, risks of crowding out, etc. 
 
This is a long term project.  What is required more immediately is a vision of the general approach 
towards a policy for the delivery of ecosystem services within a devolved framework (Gawith and 
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Hodge, 2017).  With this goal in view, it will be possible to plot a road map towards the development 
of the necessary institutions, regulations, funding arrangements and relationships that can make it 
work.  It is necessary to balance the withdrawal of old supports against the introduction of the new 
approach in order to ensure a smooth transition and minimise the social and environmental harm 
that might be caused by abrupt change. We should now promote the research, debate and testing 
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Concerns for rural land policy have widened from a focus on food production to include many other 
critical values, recognised as ecosystems services.  But our governance institutions have failed to 
reflect this.  Brexit provides the UK with an opportunity to rethink the governance of rural land.  This 
requires first an assessment of the rights and duties of land ownership.  We should explore further 
the potential for augmented markets and payment for ecosystem services, but the public good 
character of ecosystem services means that the state will play a major role, through regulation, 
facilitation, funding and working in partnership with others.  The principle of subsidiarity suggests 
that decisions should be made at different levels: national and local.  National policy will procure 
services for which there is a national commitment or priority, such as for climate change targets or 
national parks.  Local Environmental Governance Organisations will represent local values and 
priorities articulated through a natural capital plan.  Procurement schemes will take account of the 
experiences gained from agri-environment policies, extended to include partnerships or land 
purchase.  It will take time to build these new institutions.  We need more research but what is 
required now is a clear vision of the potential and a road map of the route towards it. 
 
Pullquote 
“We need to rethink the approach towards the governance of rural land  to establish institutions 
that can deliver outcomes after Brexit” 
                                                          
9 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
 

















Individual businesses and partnerships 
PES schemes 
Information 
Outcomes 
Incentives 
